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To date, the origins of Science -- The Endless Frontier, the 
famous and influential report issued in 1945 by Vannevar Bush, the 
director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), 
remain obscure behind the veil of memory. Bush himself has attri-
buted the conception of the report to a casuci.l conversation with 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who asked for it when Bush remarked 
that science might well languish in the postwar United States. More 
recently, Oscar M, Ruebhausen, the General Counsel of OSRD, has 
attributed the initiative for the report to Oscar S. Cox, the influential 
g overnment lawyer, who wanted the administrative techniques pioneered 
by OSRD for defense research adapted to a peacetime program. 1 
Though Ruebhausen 1 s quarter-century old recollections are closer to 
the truth, neither account squares with the contemporary documentary 
record. More important, both ignore that the report was written in 
a highly political context which was generated by a growing debate over 
a major policy issue -- the issue of how the federal government should 
advance science for the general we1iare in peacetime. 2 
'Ihe debate originated in a cluster of concerns centered among 
Americans of a liberal political persuasion about the extent to which 
defense research was dominated by big business in alliance with the 
leading universities. Vociferous complaints had cropped up charging 
unfair evaluation of technical ,suggestions submitted by the .Public at 
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large to OSRD, the armed services, and the National Inventors 
Council. Trained scientists and engineers were said to be in criti-
cally short supply, yet, spokesmen for numerous colleges, universities, 
and a volunteer technical group reported that they had offered their 
services and laboratories to the govermnent, only to be politely 
thanked and ignored. 3 In part the complaints reflected the discontent 
of Edisonian inventors in having to deal with a hierarchy of profession-
ally trained scientists and engineers. In part, they bespoke the policy 
of OSRD and the armed services to rely upop the better-staffed aiid 
better-equipped academic and industrial laboratories. But even 
Fortune concluded that dollar-a-year men rejected the sugges-
tions of small businessmen and inventors for the self-interested 
purpose of protecting the competitive positions of their own corporations. 
"Edison may have been the last of the heroic inventors," the New York 
�added, 11but the co?Dtry is full of university professors and 
grad:uate engineers who can make a notable contribution to technology 
and who are now shackled when they deal with a highly standardized 
1 " 4 monopo y • • • • . 
No less dii;,turbing was the distribution of research and 
development contracts to industry. In the late Thirties about two-
thirds of all industrial research workers were empl�yed in fewer 
than ten percent of all industrial laboratories. Now, some 66% of 
wartime R&D contract dollars was going to only 68 corporations, 
so:rne 40o/o to only 10. Moreover, mo�e than nine out of teri of these 
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contracts granted the ownership of the patents deriving from this publicly 
funded research to the industrial contractors, 5 To a number of critics, 
this patent policy seemed an unwarranted giveaway -- and a dangerous 
one, co�sidering the widely publicized allegations made during the war 
about the patent practice s  of big business. 
Giant American firms had entered patent agreements with foreign, 
including German, cartels. These agreements were said to have permitted 
the flow of vital technical information to the nation1 s  potential enemies and 
also to have kept the United States from developing sufficient supplies of 
such strategic raw materials as berylliUlTl, magneshnn, optiCal glass, 
chemicals, and, above all, synthetic rubber, Then, too, in the assessment 
of the Temporary National Economic Committee, the giant corporations had 
found a variety of ways to use the patent system 1'to control whole industries, 
to suppress competition, to restrict output, to enhance prices, to suppress 
inventions, and to discourage inventiveness. 11 6 In the worried conclusion 
of many liberals, the distribution of wartime contracts for rese'arch and 
development was intensifying the concentration of the resources of industrial 
research in the major corporations. Worse, the patent clauses were vesting 
considerable control of the commercial applications in corporate giants 
whose patent practices often seemed so defi antly contrary to the public 
interest. 
Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold, the administration'• s 
chief trustbuster and a central figure in the wartime patent 
controversies, explained to a congressional conunittee: If science 
and technology were to serve the public interest, you had to do more 
than just break up patent pools. You had to do something about the 
increasingly concentrated control of the underl)ring knowledge and 
know-how from which patent pools germinated. The monopolizing 
practice s  of big business would never be cured by denunciations, 
Arnold emphasized; corporate executives would always try to maxi.­
mize profits in any way possible. Ii science were to serve the public 
interest, the system by which big business 'exploited research had to 
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be reconstructed by the federal govertµnent. Only goverrunent, Arnold 
concluded, could preserve opportunity for independent inventors. Only 
govermnent could 11break the corner on research and experi.tnentation 
now enjoyed by private groups. 11 7 
Arnold was on somewhat shaky ground when he claimed that 
big business held a commanding corner on scientific research in 
the United States. In his analysis, the large corporations controlled 
even university science, determined the subj ects of academic inquiry, 
and prevented the dissemination of the results of research. Actually, 
industrial corporations provided only a small fraction of academic 
research funding, and for the most part professors _of science and 
engineering studied what they wanted and published their results in 
the pr.ofessional journals. Nevertheless, Arnold had put his finger 
on a trend that thoughtful liberals' fo�d disturbing . 'The kind of 
research, especially technologically related research, done in the 
United States was determined to a disturbingly large degree by how 
big business responded to market forces rather than by any disinter-
ested assessment of national needs, 
Waldemaer Kaempffert, the liberal science editor of the 
New York Times, argued that public needs pertinent to science.and 
technology were simply not being met. If the United States had made 
enormous progress in physics and chemistry, Kaempffert averred, 
pursuing a Thurman Arnold-like line of analysis, it was 11because the· 
profits • , , and the military advantage11 lay there. Only the Soviet 
Union had attempted to organize science to achieve social secu;ity, 
happiness, and contentment. In the United States, research had 
"grown up like Topsy, n without 11concentrated social purpose in 
planning • . •  , direction • . .  , organization. 11 Kaempffert strongly 
disapproved of the Russian social and political system, but he saw no 
reason why the U, S. government could not develop a New Dealishly 
purposeful scientific program consistent with the principles of 
freedom. OSRD exemplified how science could be properly mobilized 
for the purposes of war, Kaempffert argued, Why not do the same for 
the purposes of peace? As Kaempffert summarized the emerging 
issue: 11Laissez-faire has been abandoned as an economic principle; 
it should also be abandoned, at least as a matter of government policy, 
in science." 8 
Kaempffert's point p�ovoked considerable controversy once it 
caught the attention of Senator Harley M. Kilgore of West Virginia. A 
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small town lawyer, National Guardsman, Legionnaire, Mason, past 
exalted ruler of the Elks ,Lodge, and recently judge of the county 
crim.inal court, Kilgore was quick to admit "utter, absolute ignorance11 
of science and technology. 9 The Son of a wildcat oil prospector, he 
was equally quick to discourse on the power o� big business, including 
its power to deprive ordinary people of a fair shake. While on the 
bench in the Thirties, Kilgore won a reputation for his willingness to 
help juvenile defenders get a new start. In 1940 the pro-Roosevelt 
faction in 0e bittexly divided West Virginia Democratic party fo�d 
him a natural, if last minute, choice for the Senatorial nomination. 
Kilgore squeeked through a three-way primary with less than 40% of 
the vote, won mainly with the support of the CIO. lO Handily elected 
on FDR 1 s  coattails, he went to Washington a down-the-line New Dealer 
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eager to do all he could for the plain folks back home, especially the 
pro-labor folks who had put hi.rri into office. 
His suits wrinkled, his pockets crammed with papers, pencils, 
and a good luck horse chestnut, Kilgore threw himself into his 
Senatorial duties and soon established himself as an outspoken member 
of the Truman Committee. The more Kilgore learned about the rubber 
shortage, patent abuses, and the power of dollar-a-year men, the 
more he was convinced that a good deal was wrong with the war 
production program. He often discussed the subject with Herbert 
Schimmel, a Congressional staff member and Ph.D. in physics, wl}o 
shared Kilgore1s outrage at the rubbe-r shortage and, not �ast because 
. of his work on the House equivalent of the Truman Committee, the 
Senator's distrust of big business. 11 Sure that crucial technological 
developments had been "strangled, 11 Schim.m.el focused Kilgore' s 
attention on the technical side of the war production program. The 
more Schimmel and Kilgore talked, the more they became convinced 
that if the war production program were to succeed - - and succeed 
equitably -,. its technological operations would ha-ve to be centralized 
in an agency run by disinterested professionals -- a technological high 
co:mrnand. 12 
In 1942 quite similar thoughts occupied Maury Maverick, the 
outspoken Texas liberal and small business-minded member of the 
War Production Board. With the aim of breaking big industry1s hold 
on the technical side of war production, Maverick proposed that 
Donald Nelson, the head of the Board, establish an OSRD for strategic 
materials. 13 Reports in mid-August that Nelson was about to create 
such an a,gency disturbed Schimmel, Who was convinced, as he tf>ld 
Kilgore, that the proposed technical office could accomplish little 
inside Nelson's big business-oriented Board. Better that Congress 
should establish the office as an independent agency of the government. 
Hurriedly drafting a bill for the purpose, Schimmel urged Kilgore to 
introduce it quickly, emphasizing the importance of preempting 
Nelson -- and adding that Kilgore might well be made chairman of his 
own subcommittee to conside'r the measure. 14 Kilgore promptly 
introduced the Technology Mobilization Act. 
Aimed at breaking 11the bottlenecks11 choking the mobilization 
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of the nation's technical resources, the measure called for the ex-
ploitation of all war-rel<!-ted patents and production processes; the 
better use of small business and inventors; the provision of adequate 
sub�titutes for strategic raw materials, To these ends, the bill 
established an Office of Technological Mobilization, a super agency 
which would incorporate all the government1 s technical bureaus, both 
military and civilian. The Office would be empowered to draft techni-
cal personnel and facilities; compel the licensing of patents for war 
8 
uses; and �inance research projects which might contribute 
.
to vi<;:tory. 15
By the fall of 1942 Kilgore had his subcommittee, and in October he 
opened hearings on the measure. 
Kilgore1 s bill ran into considerable opposition, especially 
from the Army, the Navy, industrialists, and Vannevar Bush. The 
opponents flatly denied the existence of bottlenecks serious enough to 
warrant the radical changes Kilgore proposed (even friends of the bill 
joined one witness in urging of OSRD: 11Leave them alone and do not 
16 
touch them. I pray you, Do not touch them. IT) Bush, insisting 
that inventors1 suggestions were adequately reviewed, attributed 
their complaints to the impossibility of informing them, because it 
would reveal data on the status of Allied military teclmology, why 
their ideas were not used. More generally, the critics roundly 
attacked the proposed centralization of all federal technical agencies 
in one office as unwarranted regimentation. Fastening on the vast. 
powers which the office would possess, especially the power to draft 
9 
technical facilities and personnel, they decried the bill as virtually 
totalitarian. 1 7 
Kilgore acknowledged that the bill had been hastily drawn 
Schimmel had produced it literally overnight - - but he had no intention 
of dropping.it. His measure had won support from small businessmen 
and inventors, even from the Sears, Roebuck exe�utive at the top of 
the War Production Board, Doriald Nelson, whose predilection for 
centralized management, including the centralized management of 
technological development, had been intensified by the headaches of 
running the W. P. B. Though in response to Maverick1s proposal Nelson 
had recently established an Office of Production Research and Develop­
ment, he endorsed Kilgore1s scheme because the WPB had neither 
sufficient money nor power to do the job that needed to be done in the 
technological area. Moreover, Nelson and other witnesses had called 
Kilgore1s itttention to the alleged waste of scientific manpower, 
.
the 
concentration of R&D contracts, the patent giveaway -- in short, to the 
mobilization of science for war and its wideranging implications for 
peace. His vision enlarged, Kilgore redrafted his bill and introduced 
it shortly after the new Congress convened in 1943. 18 
Called the Science Mobilization Act, the new measure estab­
lished an Office of Scientific and Technological Mobilization, or OSTM, 
as a permanent independent agency of the government. To meet the 
charges of regimentation, OSTM was awarded less sweeping powers 
�an its predecessor. It could draft technical facilities and patents 
only as a last resort during and not at all beyond the war emergency. 
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It could not draft scient�ic personnel, merely certify them for de,fer­
ment to. Selective Service. And OSTM would not incorporate, just 
coordinate, the scientific and technical agencies of the federal 
governm.ent. Bespeaking Kilgore's new emphasis, especially his 
1:iberally purposeful emphasis, on science, OSTM was empowered to 
finance through grants and loans scientific and technical education and 
the advance ment of pure and applied research. {To an alarming 
degree, Kilgore explained, the academic world's increasing depe;ndence 
on industrial grants and fellowships had reduced much of university 
research to 11the status of handmaiden·for corporate or industrial 
research, and has resulted in corporate control of many of our 
schools. ") 19 In addition, OSTM was to be administered with the help 
of a board. and an advisory group, both of which were to include repre­
sentatives of industry, agriculture, labor, and small business, as well 
as science and technology. 
Equally important, OSTM was to stimulate the research enter� 
prise of scientists, inventors, and small businessmen, in part by 
compelling the disclosure and nondiscriminatory dissemination of 
information about important technical processes developed in any, 
including the major corporate, laboratories. Most important, to 
safeguard the public interest, OSTM was granted ownership and 
empowered with the exclusive right to use or to license 11any invention, 
discovery, patent, or patent right" which had resulted frq_m research 
supported with 11any money, credit, physical facilities, or personnel11 
by the federal governm.ent since the declaration of national emergency 
in 1941. 20 
Kilgore's revised bill drew considerable attention, not only in 
a new round of hearings but in the scientific and technical press. 
Numero�s favorable letters poured in from scientists, small business­
men, and inventors, Privately, twenty-two Congressmen and Senators 
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joined Kilgore in urging James F. Byrnes to establish in his new Office 
of War Mobilization a central scientific agency designed to achieve the 
same wartime purposes as Kilgore1s OSTM. Publicly, Vice-President 
Henry Wallace testified to the peacetime importance of a socially 
liberal scientific program, especially one which avoided the cOncentra­
tion of the benefits of research in any geographical area or type of 
institution. Thurman Arnold added his outspoken voice to the 
chorus in favor of the bill, eloquently analyzing the need for such a 
measure and confidently proclaiming Kilgore1s "the magna carta of 
science," 
21 
But the bill earned considerable opposition from trade as.Socia­
tions, industrial research managers, and the Army and Navy. The 
National Association of Manufacturers typically denounced the measure 
as a threat to 0socialize" all of science the United States. 22 The 
armed services, some of whose officers agreed with the NAM, 
objected in particular to the patent provisions on grounds that they 
would raise the cost of, if no� make impossible, industrial R&:D 
contracts. Both the Army and Navy dissented most vigorously frOm 
vesting any "Control over the development of military technology in a 
civilian-dominated agency. For one thing, the agency's access to 
classified information would jeopardize security. For another, it was 
one of th.e military1s dee:Pest-seated canons that, since the armed 
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services were responsible £or the use of. equipment, they should control 
its research and development. 23 
The bill also provoked emphatic dissent from the nation1s 
scientific leadership, only a fraction of whom shared the objections 
of the NAM and the military. Some scientists opposed the Kilgore bill 
for the same reasons as Frank Jewett, the President at the National 
Academy of Sciences and former head of the.Bell Telephone ·Labo;atories. 
Unalterably opposed 11to bein� made the intellectual slaves of the State, '1 
Jewett proudly reported, these scientists considered federal aid to academic 
research in any form a threat to the freedom of science. 24 Others, 
apparently a much larger group, while no less eager to maintain that 
freedom simply disliked the Kilgore bill in particular. 
The war had decidedly sharpened the scientific community's 
wariness of official bureaucratic interference with its members' 
professional autonomy. There were the security regulations, which 
required them to work in a closed-mouth fashion repugnant to the 
vitality of scientific communication. There was the endless red tape, 
which, as Karl Compton sniped, seemed to have been established on 
the assumption that "all who deal with the government have dishonest 
and selfish inclinations. 11 25 There was the necessity of submitting 
to the central direction of researc�, which even under the relatively 
permissive auspices of OSRD forced virtually everyone to spend his 
time on technical problems of someone else1s choosing. While OSRD 
scientists were willing to put up with these annoyances and infringe-
rnents to win the war, they were unlikely to submit to a similar 
- f - th 26 regrmen, or any purpose in e peace. 
"Be�are in times of peace," James B. Conant warned, "of 
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coordinating agencies with dictatorial powers -- of ideas of a peacetime 
scientific general staff." 27 Beware, in particular, Conant might 
have added, of the Kilgore bill's nonprofessional administrative scheme. 
For its own purposes, the bill defined scientific and technical personnel 
to include anyone who had at least six months training or employment in 
any technical vocation ("under this provision," a high-ranking Navy 
liaison at OSRD fumed, "the village idiot who had washed test tubes 
for six months • • .  would be a scientist11), 28 Worse, the administra-
tion of OSTM was to include representatives of small business, labor, 
and the consuming public. In the apprehension of professional 
scientists, OSTM would be run by scientific laymen whose appointments 
were bound to hinge on political criteria rather than on their qualifica-
tions for advancing the best science. 
Equally important, to both academic and industrial scientists, 
sure of the effectiveness of the current scientific mobilization, the 
bill was not only unnecessary; in the phrasing of an oil company 
scientist, its passage might well be worth "one hundred diyisions to 
our enemies." 29 As for Kilgore1s peacetime program, the critics 
dissented from OSTM's power to commandeer scientific and technical 
data which, in the claim of a scientist at General Electric, would 
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essentially force big business to aid small business by the disclosure 
of proprietary technical secrets. Worse,. according to the way the 
bill's patent clauses defined federal aid, an industrial corporation would 
lose all patent rights in an invention if, while working on a goverrunent 
research project, an armed service officer merely supplied .it with 
technical advice. Unless industry received at least a fair quid pro quo 
for its contribution to governmentally sponsored developments, the 
critics were sure, there would be no incentive for industry to partici-
. 
30 pate in federal research programs. 
In 1943 and 1944 the threats of �he Kilgore bill received a good 
deal of attention in the scientific and technical press. The editor of a 
prestigious technical journal admonished his colleagues that, unless 
they wished the future of science to be taken out of their hands, they 
had better start organizing for political action, Breaking away from 
their normal apolitical p·osture, various scientific organizations 
solemnly resolved against the bill, including the Council of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science and the War 
Policy Commitlee of the American Institute of Physics. 31 But the 
scientific commu�ty found its most influential spokesman in the 
nation1 s most influential wartime scientist, Vannevar Bush. 
Bush actually found a good deal to commend in the overall 
peacetime aims of Kilgore's bill. He endorsed in principle the 
coordination of federal scientific age
.
ncies and the establislunent of 
a scientific advisory system in the government. Bush was no special 
. enthusiast of federal aid for scientific research and training in the 
universities. All the same, he worried that the country might get 
11over�convincedn of the importance of military research as such, 
worried, too, that private universities might not be able to provide 
for themselves sufficiently in the postwar. Bush deemed it essential 
to foster basic research, in part because any program of development 
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would rest on it, in part because he keeply respected the urge of 
32 "free men everywhere and at all times" to know for its own sake. 
No less important, Bush empathized with Kilgore's eagerness 
to enlarge the technological opportunities of small business. Bush was 
an anti-New Deal conservative, but he had always backed governmental 
curbs on the domination of markets by large industrial combinations, 
In the early Twenties, Bush had been associated with a fledgling 
electronics firm, the Raytheon Corporation, which had almost been 
forced out of business when General Electric, RCA, Westinghouse, and 
AT&T formed an exclusive patent pool and marketing agreemen'f\ for 
vacuum. tubes, In the coming postwar, Bush was sure, the nation's 
prosperity would depend to a considerable extent upon the appearance 
of small businesses applying new knowledge in a useful manner. Not 
least for that reason, Bush believed it necessary to prevent large 
corporations from using the patent system to bar the entry of small 
firms into lucrative new technological markets. 33 To accomplish 
this purpose, Bush had a variety of proposals in mind, but they �id not 
include the measures specified in the Kilgore bill. 34 
Save for the bill's thrust at better treatm.ent for scientists 
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under the Selective Service System, Bush saw nothirg to conunend 
the wa:i;time features of the bill. The restrictions on big business 
would wholly disrupt industrial cooperation in the development of new 
weapons, War or peace, the patent provisions in particular would not 
serve the public interest, Bush was certain, not i£ it was in the public 
interest to encourage useful invention and its transformation into a 
marketable product. In Bush1s analysis, the temporary monopoly 
inherent in a patent was essential to encourage entrepreneurs or 
industrial· corporations to invest capital in technological deVelopment. 
To vest patent rights in the _government, Bush was certain, would be to 
destroy that incentive and, hence, to deprive the public of the conrmer-
cial development of whatever technological advances might emerge from 
federally sponsored research. 35 
Like so many other scientists, Bush had his doubts about the 
scientific features of the bill, which seemed to threaten the political 
control of research, To Bush1s mind, Kilgore si.m.ply did not yet 
understand the operation or role of science in the United States, 
Perhaps the Senator's staff kept steering him into 11strange paths. 11 
Whatever the caS'e, because he found a good deal in the bill appealing, 
Bush had no intention of indulging in a blanket rejection of the measure. 
While he was ready to do battle with Kilgore if necessary -- he 
bristled when the Senator called for information on OSRD contracts 
he counted it the better and more .responsible part of wisdom to attempt 
to steer him onto the proper path by persuading Kilgore to draft a new 
and more constructive measure. The Senator had made a good �eal 
of progresS in the last two years; Bush hoped that under his expert 
guidance he would make a great deal more. 36 
In a long, carefully phrased letter at the end of 1943, Bush 
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urged Kilgore to forget about the wartime mobilization of science and 
concentrate on a peacetime program. He applauded Kilgore1s goal of 
coordinating federal scientific agencies, so long as coordination meant 
cooperation rather than centralized control. He endorsed the establish­
ment of a scientific advisory system in the federal government, so long 
as it was staffed by the best scientists -- they were bound to be 
"disinterested, 11 Bush assured -- rather than by representatives of 
such interested groups as labor, small business, and consmners, He 
backed federal support for academic research and training, so long as 
such support advanced the work of the most brilliant, not the generally 
mediocre, minds and so long as it did not infringe upon the professional 
and intellectual independence of the scientist or his laboratory. And 
Bush commended Kilgore' s concern for assuring that industrial
'
· 
laboratories operated in the public interest. But the best way to 
achieve that goal, he insisted, was not to establish restrictions on 
industrial research or to impose a senseless patent policy. It was 
to assure industrial competition, 37 
Kilgore tended to write off much of the opposition to his 
measure to 11vested interests. 11 
38 
But by now, with industry turning 
out tons of war goods, including tons of synthetic rubber, the wartime 
provisions of his bill seemed unnecessary. Though still "obsessed11 
b}r the patent issue, in the report of a scientist who discussed the 
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matter with him, Kilgore appreciated many of the scientific community's 
dissatisfactions with the existing measure. 39 In early 1944 Kilgore 
and his staff drafted a new bill, a measure for the postwar promotion 
o f  pure and applied research as well as scientific education and training 
under a National Science Foundation. 
Kilgore1s new bill conceded a nmnber of points to his critics.· 
While the proposed Foundation could encourage the coordination of the 
government1s technical bureaus, its recommendations were not to be 
binding on·any agency. The Foundation wa� also to include·a separate 
division for defense researc
_
h dominated by members of the War and Navy 
Departnients and explicitly guaranteed a mini.tnum percentage of the 
agency1s total annual appropriation. Scientists and engineers supported 
by the Foundation were to be assured free rein in the exercise of their 
c::reative talents and were to be protected in their right to hold and 
express independent opinions on scientific and technical matters. On the 
industrial front, instead of compelling the disclosure of proprietary 
secrets, the Foundation would aid small business and inventors simply 
by publishing reports of progress in research. As for patents which 
resulted from publicly aided research and development, the Foundation 
would still own all patents which resulted from federally funded research, 
but it would recognize the proper interests ·of private individuals and 
organizations who had contributed to the invention or process in 
question. 40 
19 
Kilgore bad come a long way since 1942, when he had been primarily 
concerned with the problems of inventors, entrepreneurs, and war produc­
tion; his bill of 1944 amounted to a generally meritorious response to 
Waldemaer Kaempffert's call for an end to laissez-faire in science. Its 
powers limited, Kilgore1 s National Science Foundation was unlikely to be a 
dictatorial superagency. While his NSF was to give government laboratories 
priority in the dispensation of its funds, it was also to award research 
contracts and scholarships to colleges and universities. Kilgore1s NSF was 
designed well enough just possibily to have advanced basic science in the 
successful manner of the emerging National Institutes of Healfu. At the same 
tUne, Kilgore' s NSF was to be administered by a single director with the aid 
of a presidentially appointed board that included representatives of industry, 
labor, agriculture, education, and the consum.ing public; as such, Kilgore1s 
Foundation would have been prone to sponsor progra.tns of funda.tnental and 
applied research pertinent to the nation's current social and economic needs, 41 
In all, Kilgore1s NSF would preserve the intellectual freedom of
°the scientists 
whom it sponsored, but it would be programmatically responsive, in a liberal 
fashion, to the political system. 
Before introducing his new bill, Kilgore invited the leadership of 
OSRD to participate in a final revision. To Frank Jewett, the latest draft 
merely incorporated all the 1'iniquities" of the previous version and added a 
few more. Though Bush considered it an Unprovement, he doubted that �'such 
a setup will do much good, and it certainly will do strange things. 11 42 The 
(p. 19a follows] 
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differences between Bush and Kilgore boiled down to a basic issue: Kilgore 
wanted. an NSF respons
ive to lay control and prepared to support research
for the advancement of the general welfare; Bush and his colleagues wanted 
an agency run by scientists mainly for the purpose of advancing science. 
In late October 1944 Oscar Cox, the imaginative and influential· 
administration lawyer, gave Bush' an opportunity to seize the initiatiVe from 
Kilgore, Perhaps with an eye on the upcoming election, Cox had come away 
from a talk with Harry Hopkins with an idea: Why not have the President 
send a letter to Vannevar Bush, asking for�a 
report on what steps should be taken to utilize the results of wartime 
research and development -- produced at public expense, the results 
belonged to the public, Cox supposed -- to create a higher standard of 
living and full employmeri.t in the postwar? 43 
Cox drafted just such a letter and, late in the afternoon of 
October 24, discussed it with Bush and the General Counsel of OSRD, 
zo 
Oscar M. Ruebhausen. Bush readily agreed that it would be appropriate, 
consistent with military security, to arrange for the expeditious release 
of classified scientific information of potential peacetime use, Turning 
to the broader question of federal research in the postwar, Bush also 
registered his dissent from establishing an OSRD-like program in 
peacetime, including, as he made emphatically clear to Cox, the 
program in the Kilgore bill. But Bush did allow that he favored some 
sort of governmental support of academic science in the postwar, 
especially in the .lean years when private industry and private univer-
sities might be unable to underwrite much research themselves, Since 
the Kilgore bill seemed unlikely to receive any action before the new 
Congress convened in January 1945, Bush and Cox agreed that it would
be worthwhile to develop an alternative legislative approach, To that 
end, Cox would attempt to have the President request Bush1s views on 
the broad issue of postwar research and development, a request which 
would give Bush an opportunity to go on record with his p�oposals 
about what the govermnent should do to advance science for the 
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general welfare. 
Ruebhausen pXomptly drafted a new Presidential letter for Cox. 
The doctunent made its ·way to the Oval Office through Harry Hopkins, 
who had Cox modify it slightly, and Samuel I. Rosenman, FDR1s 
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chief wordsmith, who spruced up the language in conformity with the 
President's style. Bush and Conant had urged delay until after the 
election, since the publication of the letter beforehand might prejudice
its reception. 45 Issued by the President on November 17, 1944, it was
released on November 20, to a nationwide flurry of favorable news
Stories and editoi:ial comment. 46 
Opening with a preamble upon the success. of OSRD, the letter 
declared that there was 11no reason why the lessons to be found in this 
experiment'1 could not be profitably employed in peacetime to itnprove 
the national health, create new jobs and enterprises, and raise the 
. standard of living. With that objective in mind, the President asked 
Bush for recommendations in response to four questions: 
I. 
z. 
3. 
4. 
How might the scientific information developed during 
the war be made known, consistent with military 
security, to advance the general welfare? 
.What might be done to organize a program of medical 
research? 
What might the government do tO aid research gener­
ally in public and private institutions? 
What might be done to discover and develop scientific 
talent in American youth ? 4 7 
Bush appointed four committees, each consisting of prorn�ent 
men drawn from appropriate fields,. to report on the £ou1: questions. 
Each was left largely to its own devices, though Bush did emphasize 
to all of them how important it was to complete the report before 
Kilgore's legislation was passed. Bush anticipated no serious pro-
blems for the committees on the release of scientific information, 
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medical research, and the development of scientific talent. But 
committee 3, he expected, faced quite a. difficult and sensitive ta:sk, 
since, in the words of the letter, it was charged with considering the 
"proper roles of public and of private research, and their interrelation11 
-- charged, in short, with reporting upon precisely the controversial 
issues manifest in the Kilgore bill. 48 
Eager to have an unimpeachably balanced panel, Bush a.ppointed 
seventeen men to committee 3, nine of them academics, mainly 
administrators, who were divided almost evenly between public and 
private institutions. He included two representatives of big business, 
Robert E. Wilson, the chairman of the board of Standard Oil of 
Indiana, and Oliver E. Buckley, the president of the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories. He also appointed two small businessmen, Bradl�y 
Dewey, the president of the Dewey and Ahny Chemical Company, and 
Edwin H. Land, the president and director of research of the 
remarkably successful young firm, the Polaroid Corporation. The 
chairman of committee 3 was the high-ranking member of the 
National Academy of Sciences and president of The Johns Hopkins 
University, Isaiah Bowman. 49 
Despite its broad mandate, the BoWinan Committee took as 
the chief is.sue before it whether the federal govermnent ought to 
g'et into the business of supporting scientific research in the universities 
outside of agriculture. Like Georgy Ellery Hale in World War I 
and Frank Jewett now, Part of the committee, including a number 
of its academic members, opposed such support on grounds that it 
wotild open the door .to political control of the academic world. SO 
But the committee was dutifully surveying the needs of academic 
science in the postwar. As the information came in, the opposition 
to federal support diminished, because without it the prospects of 
peacetime research seemed decidedly bleak. 
The academic world seemed likely to lose able scie'ntists 
permanently to industrial a1:1d defense research. The war effort had 
given professors the heady taste of doing research 
with few financial restraints. Typically, the young physicists at 
the MIT Radiation Laboratory had grown accustomed merely to 
.signing an order for a new instrument whose cost would have dead-
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locked a faculty before the war. University administrators doubted 
that able scientists would be satisfied to return to the routine of hea v y  
teaching loads, limited equi:r)ment budgets, and low salaries. And if 
they did not, the advance of fundamental knowledge, which the war 
effort had brought virtually to a halt, would proceed at a decidedly slow 
rate in the peace. 51 
Equally troubling, by any standard the nation faced a serious 
deficit of trained scientific manpower. The Selective Service system 
had just about stripped the grad�te schools of candidates for Ph.D.' s 
in the sciences, and the wholesale drafting of able-bodied undergraduate 
males had sharply reduced the pool from which future doctoral 
� 
Candidates Could be recruited, According to the studies of the 
Bowman comntlttee's counterpart on scientific manpower, the war 
had cost science some 17, 000 advanced and 150, 000 first degree 
graduates. The production of scientific doctorates was not expected 
to reach normal levels again until the mid-19501 s. Based on projec­
tions of the prewar growth rate, analysts predicted that by 1955 
there would be a deficit of 2, 000 Ph.D. 1s in physics, which was 
sizable measured against a skyrocketing demand for physicists in 
industry alone, 
52 
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The members of the Bowman committee considered the•sil.uation 
worrisome. Science was essential to the nation's economy, defense, 
and prestige, and the United States could no longer rely on war-ravaged 
Europe for its supply of basic knowledge, Moreover, it was well-kno"Wn 
that other world powers, including Soviet Russia, had husbanded their 
scientific manpower during the war and
. 
intended to foster scientific 
research vigorously in the peace, To the Bowrn.an committee, it' 
seemed iinperative that basic scientific research and training proceed 
at a vigorous pace in the postwar United States, too, But private 
resources, they were convinced, would not suffice to meet the needs 
of the nation's academic scientific enterprise. All things considered, 
the Bowman committee found itself 11forced, 11 in the claim of its final 
report to Bush, to conclude that some measure of federal aid would be 
necessary to maintain an appropriate level of scientific research and 
training in the United States. 
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To the extent that the Bownian conunittee recommended such 
a federal program, its report resembled Kilgore's ilnplied call for an 
end to laissez-faire in sclence; like Kilgore, the Bowman report urged 
the establishment of a new agency, the National Research Foundation. 
But Unlike Kilgore, it 
insisted that this agency must be prevented from dictating -- .their 
Z5 
Word for central direction of any sort -- the nation1 s scientific program. 
It also had to be kept free from the influence of pressure groups, from 
administration by anyone who did not have a thorough understanding of 
science, and from.the necessity of producin� immediate practical: 
results, Kilgore may have wanted his agency to spend its money 
primarily in governmental laboratories capable of high-quality applied 
research. The Bowman committee1s National Research Foundation 
was to support research and training solely in nonprofit institutions, 
Ip.eaning mainly those leading educational institutions usually responsible 
for the best basic resear�h. 
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Save for the minority report of thirty-six year old Edwin H. 
Land, the recommendations of the Bowm.an committee ran no less 
contrary to Kilgore in their approach to the problems of small business. 
Land, whose soci.al imagination matched his remarkable 
technical ingenuity, saw a new and humane industrial frontier in the 
small manufacturing corporation oriented towards research; as 
such, it could be a small social and economic unit, a haven of indi-
vidual opportunity located far from the .slums of the cities. Like 
Kilgore, Land argued that the federal government ought to stimulate 
the launching of such new scientific enterprises by aiding young people 
who were more interested in applying new knowledge than in pursuirig 
basic inquiry. Let the govermnent encourage undergraduates to invent 
solutions to unsolved technological problems, Land proposed,. and then 
help them after graduation to perfect their inventions and strike out for 
themselves in an actual business enterprise. 55 
But the Bowman committee did not endor'se Land1s proposal. 
To encourage the growth of small research enterprises, it proposed 
merely that the government establish teclmical advisory clinics for 
small business around the conntry. It also noted that inconsistent 
rulings from the Bureau of Internal Revenue about the tax deductibility 
of research expenses placed small business -- and big business, too, 
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their report might have added - - in an uncertain and financially 
hazardous position, and it urged the government to award such deductions 
clearcut legal sanction. Otherwise, the committee declined to discuss 
the patent issue (because President Truman had recently asked Bush to, 
serve on a committee under Secretary Henry Wallace to s'tudy the 
entire national patent system). While the Bowman committee acknow­
ledged the "increasing concentration of industrial research in this 
country, 11 it generally proposed no strong goverrunental action to 
. 56 offset the trend. 
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Delivered on May 9, 1945 - - it was the last to come in -- the 
Bowman report was complemented and reinforced by the conclusions of 
. the other three committees. Convinced that the country would profi� 
more by revealing than by restricting wartime scientific kno.v ledge, 
committee 1 urged the speedy release of classified scienti£ic information. 
Committee 2 recommended a program of federal aid to medical, research 
and training, emphasizing the necessity of keeping the program free of 
political control. And committee 4 eloquently analyzed how financial 
circumstances kept many talented youngsters out of science. Warning 
against developing an oversupply of scientists and against diverting 
too much talent away from the social sciences and the humanities, 
the committee endorsed a limited program of federal scholarships 
and fellowships, including, partly to discourage the participation of 
the children of well-to-do families, a national service obligation for 
all such scholars and fellows. 57 
Long before the reports were in, Bush had decided to top 
them all off with an overall interpretive statement of his own. He 
worked on the statement through the spring of 1945, with considerable 
help from Oscar Ruebhausen, Carroll L. Wilson, his chief assistant; 
and Bethuel M. Webster, a New York lawyer and able writer who. was 
engaged to draw up the prelim.inary•dra£t. All the committee reports 
had certain key points in common, including the point that any 
mechanism for federal support of science must contain certain 
essential safeguards against political cOntrol, interference with 
internal institutional affairs, and excessive instability in duration and 
amount of funding. But the reports differed about how to establish the 
necessa'ry safeguards. Bush chose not to attempt to reconcile the 
differences, For one thing, it would drag out the writing of his report 
endlessly. For another, it seemed wiser simply .to take the best 
suggestions from each report, not least because some of the rest 
violated democratic principles and, in any case, fell beyond the bounds 
of what Bush expected that Congress might reasonably accept. 58 
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Bush disliked the proposal of committe_e 2 that medical research 
and training be supported by a separate independent agency. To Bush1s 
mind, it made more sense administratively to establish the medical 
program in the same agency as the program for the basic sciences, 
Equally important, he suspected that it would be difficult enough to 
persuad� Congress to create just one llew independent agency, l�t 
alone two, or worse, if military research were considered, three. 
Because of the spectacular success of OSRD, the .Army, Navy, and 
most defense scientists agreed that the federal government ought to 
provide for a civilian-rWl. peacetime research program on long-range 
.military problems. Instead of establishing a separate agency for the 
purpose, Bush deemed it both wise and feasible to incorporate it, like 
medical research, in a singl'e agency, the National Research 
Foundation. 59 
But Bush could not go along with the scheme for the Found.a� 
tion proposed by the Bowman committee. To assure stability in its 
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funding and to insulate it from political control, including the political 
pulling. arid hauling of the annual Congressional appropriations process, 
the Bowman committee proposed that the Foundation be an independent 
goverrunent corporation, While the President would appoint its board 
of trustees, he would have to choose the members from a panel nominated 
by the National Academy of Sciences. Moreover, the Foundation was to 
be financed by a large non-interest bearing capital fund -- $500, 000, 000 
was suggested -- which could be spent at its discretion. To insulate 
the academic world from contr�l by the Follndation, the funds were to 
be awarded automatically on a match�g basis to qualified universities 
which agreed to participate in the plan. Clarence Dykstra, whose duties 
as the new chancellor of UCLA had prevented him from participating in 
the deliberations of the Bowtnan corrunittee, commented: 11i.e proposed 
Foundation seemed a way for "private universities to get large public 
support through the back door • • •  [ withoutJ the sort of responsibility 
to the public that state institutions must accept. 11 60 
Of course the board of trustees should consist of persons who 
understood the."peculiarities of scientific research and education, 11 
Carroll Wilson advised Bush. But the board of trustees should "truly" 
represent the public interest and not "primarily • . .  those groups 
which will be the recipients of support." 61 Of course, stability of 
support was essential, and so was freedom from political interference 
with basic research. All the same, the Bureau of the Budget had 
made pointedly clear that any federal venture in research would 
have to be subject to the normal fiscal and policy controls of the 
Congress and the Executive Branch. 62 
Withal, while Bush endorsed the arguments for a program of 
federal support and the warnings against political control, he had his 
own version of a National Research Foundation to recornrnend, Bush1 s 
Foundation was to advance research and training· in all the natural 
sciences, including biology and medicine, and it was to have a division 
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for long-range military- research, His Foundation was also to be run by a part­
time board selected and appointed by the President from the public at large. 
It was to be funded annually and subject to the normal fiscal controls of 
the government. Inst"?ad of supporting research by providing funds to 
participating universities automatically on a matching basis, it was to 
award grants and contracts for specific research projects. 63 
Yet however much Bush's interpretive sununary departed from 
the reports of his conunittees, his final version ran no less CO{ltrary 
to Kilgore1s approach on key points. If Kilgore1s agency was to be 
governed by a coalition representing such interest groups as consumers 
and small businessmen, Bush insisted that his Foundation had to be 
governed by cit izens selected only on the basis of their interest in 
and capacity to support the work of the agency, If Kilgore aimed to 
fund socially and economically useful research primarily in federal 
laboratories, Bush's Foundation was to support pure science in _non-
profit research institutions, mainly universities. !£the military 
[p. 30a follows] 
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research divisio� in Ki.lgore's Foundation would be dominated by militar.y 
men, in Bush's Foundation it would be controlled by civilians. Then, too, 
th� director of Bush1 s Foundation was to be responsible to the part-time 
board, not to the President, which would make Bush's agency much less 
responsive to the political system than Kilgore' s. 
As a member of Bush1s staff summarized his boss1s agency, "While 
created by Congres s ,  [ it} is a new social invention -- of government 
sanction and support but professional guidance and administration, " 64 
poing along with the Bowman committee on the more general 
issues raised by Kilgore, Bush proposed little more to help small 
b\lsiness than technical clinic s and a clarification of the tax laws as 
3 1  
they affected industrial research. He acknowledged that 11uncertainties" 
and irabuses" in the patent system had "Unpaired the ability of small 
industries to translate new ideas into processes and products of value 
to the Nation. 1 1  But though Bush was of course deferring his full 
thoughts on the patent system to Secretary Wallace's study, he did 
suggest how he regarded Kilgore1 s insistence on governmental ownership 
of patents developed in the course of federally sponsored research. Bush 
proposed that the disposition of rights in patents deriving from work 
supported.by the National Research Foundation should be left up to the 
discretion of the director, with the understanding that the public 
interest would normally be adequately served if the government 
received a royalty-free license for governmental purposes, 65 
By the beginning of June 1945 Bush had finished his report and 
sent it off to the printer. Science - - The Endless Frontier - - 11new 
frontiers of the mind are before us, 11 Oscar Cox had concluded his 
original draft of the letter from FDR to Bush - - was an eloquent, well-
argued docu:ment which enjoyed the endorsement of Bush's four 
committee's, all of whose members found his changes in the institutional 
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66 mechanism of support acceptable. Released to the public on �uly 
19, it was also, as an OSRD staff member happily remarked, "an 
instant smash hit, " applauded in scores of editorials across the 
ideological, partisan, and geographical spectrum. 67 On July 19, 
too, Senator Warren G, Magnuson of Washington introduced legislation 
based on the Bush report to establish a National Research Foundation. 
But Bush 1 s  report was no smash hit with Waldemaer Kaempffert 
or the New Republic, which commented: "Research needs to be 
coordinated carefully and the projects sho�ld be selected in terms of 
our national necessities, and not the \lCcidental interests of various 
scientific groups, 1 ' 68 It failed to inspire Kilgore, who responded to 
Magnuson's legislative move by promptly introducing his own revised 
bill for a National Science Foundation, No less important, Bush's 
report received a decidedly cool response among officials in the Trurrian 
administration responsible for advising the President upon the recon-
version of the country, including its science, to a peacetime footing. 
It was not just that Harold Smith, the Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget, wondered, only half-puckishly, whether the "Endless Frontiern 
implied the "Endless Expenditure. " It was that many influential 
officials simply believed with James R. Nevnnan, .a high-ranking 
staff member of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, that 
the proposals in Bush's report did "not fulfill the broad, democratic 
purposes which a Federal resear'ch agency should accomplish. 1' 69 . . 
Analysts like Newman recognized Science - - The Endless Frontier � 
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for what in so many respects it was -- essentially a conservative re sponse 
to Kilgore1s liberal initiative. Bush was willing to endorse an end to 
laissez -faire in American science insofar as he was willing to put the 
goverrunent into the business of funding academic research. But while 
Kilgore's program aimed at organizing scientific res earch in the best 
interests of meeting the nation's social and economic needs, Bush es sentially 
aimed at enlisting the nation's social and economic resources in the interest 
of advancing the best science. With Science - - the Endless Frontier, Bush 
had produced what in context was a political docUIUent, a textual v•!eapon in 
the political battles already joined over the shape, purpose, and choice 
of federal policy for scientific research and .development in the postwar era, 
. 
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